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For Kornai, like for Mises, the world of equilibrium, or what Mises 
called the “evenly rotating economy” is an indispensable mental tool 
for understanding economic theory. But it is demonstrably not about the 
world we live in and cannot tell us about the actual economic problems 
– “the big questions” to use Kornai’s language – we actually face.
(Peter Leeson 2007)
1. INTRODUCTION
Central banks have to be credible. They have to win public trust that they are able 
to keep the economy on an equilibrium growth path. However, they are aware that 
the world is not ergodic (self-replicating), which makes the future uncertain, and 
they have to base their decisions on unobservable values such as the natural rate 
of unemployment and the potential rate of growth. Moreover, what is regarded 
as the best practice for central banks may become outdated due to the structural 
changes in the economy. All this makes central banks hesitant guardians of the 
economy’s equilibrium.
Being former interest rate setters,1 we experienced such situations. We remem-
ber how frequently we were asked whether our central bank was behind the curve. 
This question was usually a polite suggestion that we might perhaps already be 
late with hiking interest rates soon enough to prevent a developing wage-cost 
spiral. A prudent Monetary Policy Committee member was expected to be ready 
to vote for preemptive interest rate hikes to hedge the economy against the risk 
of second-round effects. However, in practice, the choice may be much more 
complex. 
A good example is Poland in 2007–2008, when the rates of GDP and wage 
growth were relatively high and the mortgage market was booming. Under normal 
circumstances, a decision to raise interest rate would be obvious. In 2007–2008, 
it raised doubts. The problem was that a large part of bank mortgage lending was 
in Swiss francs at that time. This produced the risk that hiking interest rate might 
make foreign exchange loans even more attractive due to the widening of interest 
rate differential and further Polish zloty appreciations (driven by carry trade). 
The important factor making the National Bank of Poland’s (NBP) choice dif-
ficult was that property prices on the US mortgage market collapsed already in 
autumn 2006. Since 2007, the IMF and the BIS were suggesting that this might 
trigger a recession in the American economy, as was invariably the case during 
1  In the 2000s, we had the honor of being members of the Monetary Policy Council of the Na-
tional Bank of Poland.
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the whole period after World War 2 with the exception of the ending of the Ko-
rean War and the burst of the Dotcom Bubble. 
All in all, the NBP decided for a moderate increase in interest rate, which was a 
compromise between taking into consideration the ensuing slowdown in the glo-
bal economy and adhering to the best practice demanding central banks to shield 
the economy from second-round effects. 
Following this introductory example, we turn to our discussion of the fac-
tors that make central bankers hesitant guardians of equilibrium. Section 2 re-
flects on some well-described instances of monetary boards decisions, which, 
although considered fully rational at the time of their making, proved to be coun-
terproductive in the ex-post assessment. Our conclusion is that those decisions 
were commonly driven by the policy-makers’ adherence to the prevailing best 
practice of monetary policy, which (being based on history) proved to be mis-
leading in the light of structural changes in the economy. Section 3 focuses on 
the still controversial decisions of central banks to engage in quantitative eas-
ing following the Lehman collapse. While decisions can be considered to go 
against the previously prevailing best practice, we argue that it was justified in 
the light of the threat to financial stability, which has become a new territory of 
central banking. Section 4 concludes. We finish our paper with a tribute to János 
Kornai’s intellectual heritage.
2. BELIEFS AND DECISIONS
The period of the gold standard system before 1914 was favorable for central 
banks. In general, they did not face difficult choices. Luckily, the rate of growth 
in gold and money supply tended to be consistent with the rate of GDP growth, 
which tended to secure price stability (Cassel 1936). The lack of the exchange 
rate risk facilitated the constant recycling of capital from creditor to debtor coun-
tries, which contributed to international equilibrium. Due to the high price elas-
ticity of capital flows, central banks’ interest rate policy had a kind of fine tuning 
role. The purpose was to induce capital inflows when it was necessary to stabilize 
the stock of gold reserves. Central banks did not sterilize flows of gold, which 
created a historically unique situation when adjustments in creditor and debtor 
countries economies were symmetric. 
The interwar gold standard was different. Central banks were taking unfortu-
nate decisions under the pressure of the dominant beliefs on what was the best 
practice. 
In the 1920s, the Bank of France was motivated by the belief that the part of 
foreign exchange reserves that was not in the form of gold may constitute infla-
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tionary pressure. This belief pushed the Bank into the unfortunate decision of 
converting its foreign exchange reserves into gold, which deepened the relative 
shortage of gold reserves in deficit economies (Irwin 2011). 
The relative shortage of gold in the deficit countries was alleviated by capi-
tal outflows from the United States and the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, the 
Federal Reserve sterilized the growth in its gold reserves, which forced deficit 
countries to keep their interest rates on a relatively high level in order to attract 
capital inflows. 
The unfortunate decision of the Bank of England to return to the prewar gold 
parity despite the fact that since the outbreak of World War 2, inflation in the 
United Kingdom was significantly higher than in the United States. The result-
ing overvaluation of the British pound hampered British exports. Maintaining its 
price competitiveness was costly in terms of economic growth because the struc-
tural changes in the British economy produced price and wage stickiness. 
In the early 1930s, the factor that contributed to the transformation of the ini-
tial recession into the Great Depression was the Federal Reserve’s unfortunate 
decision not to provide sufficient liquidity to banks during the early days of the 
bank run. This led to massive bank bankruptcies and a fall in money supply by a 
third (Simons 1936). 
The Federal Reserve’s decision was probably motivated by an adherence to the 
then dominant liquidationist view of the Austrian School, which maintained that 
recessions were necessary for enabling economies to get rid of excessive invest-
ments (De Long 1990). While it is difficult to assess to what extent the Federal 
Reserve was actually motivated by the Austrian School beliefs (White 2008), 
both Friedrich Hayek and Lionel Robbins admitted that in the 1930s they under-
estimated the impact of deflation on deepening the crisis (Hayek1975; Robbins 
1979).
In the 1930s, it turned out that fiscal expansion might be necessary to revitalize 
investment and effective demand during protracted economic stagnation and de-
pressed expectations. In the 1950s and the 1960s, it was believed that a mixture of 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy is essential to keep the economy on an 
equilibrium growth path. Central banks became government-dependent and their 
task was to contribute to stabilizing effective demand and employment.
In the late 1950s, the emergence of the Phillips curve allowed central banks 
to believe that they might choose the right combination of inflation and the rate 
of unemployment. In the late 1960s, Friedman and Phelps warned that using 
monetary expansion for enhancing economic growth might boost inflationary ex-
pectations and develop a second-round effect, i.e., a wage-price spiral (Gordon 
2008).
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During the two oil shocks of the 1970s, this risk materialized. Phillips curve 
indeed heavily steepened. In several countries inflation increased sharply with-
out simultaneous decrease in unemployment rate. The stagflation ensued. The 
structural factors which facilitated wage-price spiral to develop was the growing 
bargaining power of trade unions after long post-war recovery and the relative 
weakness of the global price competition.
Central banks were hesitant to raise interest rates sharply, as they were afraid 
that it might be costly due to the wage and price stickiness. Only the Bundesbank 
and the Swiss National Bank hiked interest rates sufficiently to shield their econ-
omies from price-wage spiral. They could do this as in contrast to other central 
banks they were already at that time independent from the government. 
In the 1980s, central banks were gaining independence one by one and they im-
plemented a tight monetary policy despite that disinflation turned out to be costly 
in terms of growth and unemployment (Goodhart 2017). Nonetheless, central 
banks succeeded in stabilizing inflation and inflationary expectations at a low 
level, which brought about a permanent decrease in long-term interest rates. In the 
1990s, central banks adopted an inflation targeting policy as it was better suited to 
low inflation than the previous strategy of controlling monetary aggregates.
The disinflation of the 1980s was facilitated by structural changes. Most im-
portant among these were the weakening of the trade unions due to legal changes 
and the shrinking share of traditional industries. The fading trade unions’ bargain-
ing power and technological change started to produce an increasing productiv-
ity-wage gap. At the same time, globalization made international price competi-
tion much stronger, which narrowed the scope for wage increases. The Phillips 
curve was flattening in the 1980s. The development of a strong wage-price spiral 
seemed increasingly less possible. 
Nonetheless, the best practice for central bankers still was to prevent the de-
velopment of second-round effects. The dominant New Keynesian belief was that 
stable inflation is the necessary and sufficient condition for keeping the economy 
on the equilibrium growth path (Alesina et al. 2001). One example was the ECB’s 
decision to hike interest rate in 2008 when economic growth was slowing down. 
The reasons behind this decision were worries that the rise in inflation, caused 
by rising oil and other commodity prices, may induce second-round effects. The 
hike was pre-announced in the ECB’s monthly bulletin emphasizing the risk of a 
price-wage spiral. The decision was taken despite some other euro zone central 
banks were not seeing the necessity to raise interest rates. In May 2008, the Banca 
d’Italia monthly bulletin underlined that the 2000s were not similar to the 1970s 
due to the much weaker trade unions bargaining power and much stronger inter-
national price competition.
130 JERZY HAUSNER – ANDRZEJ SŁAWIŃSKI
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
Of course, when assessing ex post the ECB decisions, one has to consider 
that no-one was able to predict that the collapse of Lehman Brothers in autumn 
2008 would drastically deepen the global banking crisis and lead to worldwide 
recession. Before the Lehman collapse, it seemed that central banks succeeded 
in coping with the acute global liquidity crisis. Forecasts at that time indicated 
a mild and relatively short recession. Nonetheless, the ECB’s decision was an 
example of an excessive adherence to what was believed to be the best practice 
at a given time. 
After the outbreak of the global banking crisis, the balance sheet recessions 
forced a number of central banks to implement unconventional instruments. The 
most important was quantitative easing (QE). From a technical point of view, 
the QE programs constituted massive central bank interventions mainly on the 
treasury bond market to engineer a fall in long-term interest rates. The still unap-
preciated benefit of QE is an effective reduction of public debts, as the QE pro-
grams effectively convert Treasury bonds, which are in central banks’ assets, into 
zero-coupon consoles (Paris – Wyplosz 2014). This results from the fact that the 
central banks give back to the government both interest payments in the form of 
seigniorage and principal payments through reinvesting them on the secondary 
Treasury bond market. Hence, the QE programs contributed to economic recov-
eries by creating more fiscal space for governments. 
The recent situation illustrates why central banks cannot escape from being 
hesitant guardians of equilibrium: on the one hand, they intend to tighten mon-
etary policy in order to tame excessive risk-taking in the financial sector, while 
on the other hand, they still cannot count on fully convincing explanation of the 
riddle of why the rate of growth in wages is unexpectedly low despite historically 
low rates of unemployment (Haldane 2017). 
As far as more distant horizons are concerned, a potential materialization of 
secular stagnation risk might limit the scope for conducting a conventional mon-
etary policy. Central banks would have to re-invent their role and the terms of 
coordination with fiscal authorities. The Japanese example illustrates that this 
may take a long period of time. 
3. FINANCIAL STABILITY CHALLENGES
Financial institutions’ tendency to take excessive risks results mainly from the 
two factors. On the one hand, they enjoy soft budget constraint as they are able to 
create themselves the sources of their funding, e.g. wholesale (mainly interbank) 
deposits. On the other hand, the informational efficiency of financial markets 
creates situation in which the only way to increase the rate of return (apart from 
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increasing incomes from fees) is to take more risks. Under such circumstances 
financial institution display a tendency to use leverage in order to increase risk 
and the expected rate of return. Additionally, the emergence of the vast global 
short-term wholesale money markets (used for funding short-term arbitrage and 
winding up leverage) banks became highly interconnected (Goodhart – Perotti 
2015). It became necessary to save large and highly interconnected banks in or-
der to shield the economy from the systemic risk. Knowing this the too-big-to-
fail banks (TBTF) were taking excessive risks. They assumed that in emergency 
they would be bailed out with taxpayer money. And they were regrettably right. 
During the recent global banking crisis only Lehman Brothers was allowed to 
bankrupt.
3.1. The procyclicality of shadow money creation
The recent crisis was caused by a number of factors. The two most important 
causes were the large scale of using short-term interbank deposits for funding 
long-term mortgage loans and the massive issuance of illiquid (i.e., risky) struc-
tured bonds, of which the most spectacular example were the Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs). The large investment banks yielded to the temptation of 
purchasing these illiquid bonds, while their natural habitat was to be involved 
in short-term arbitrage transactions (mainly relative value trades) on liquid mar-
kets. Due to the sharp fall across asset-backed securities prices (including CDOs) 
universal and investment banks took large losses, which triggered liquidity crisis 
augmented by the runs on repo markets (Copeland – Walker 2012).
Bearing in mind the experiences of the 1930s, central banks provided banks 
and non-bank financial institutions with ample liquidity. The Federal Reserve 
began to play the role of the global lender of last resort providing liquidity to 
European central banks and directly to European large banks. One of the reasons 
was that before the crisis, European banks were massively taking deposits from 
US money market funds to buy Asset-Backed Commercial Papers (ABCP) issued 
by the US securitization funds. After the outbreak of the crisis, they lost access to 
the dollar financing of their liabilities. The gap was filled by the Federal Reserve 
(Broz 2015).
Before the crisis, it was believed that the progress in measuring and managing 
risk would create a situation in which banks will effectively adjust their potential 
losses to their capital, which was believed to hedge banks from the bankruptcy 
risk. The assumption was that solvent banks would always have access to liquid-
ity. This is why Basel II did not regulate liquidity management in banks. 
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After the crisis, Basel III imposed the new rules of managing liquidity, which 
addressed the problem of banks funding long-term mortgage loans with short-
term wholesale deposits. Nevertheless, the creation of short-term funding for the 
shadow banking system remains unregulated. 
In his recent book, Richard Bookstaber depicts financial system as a three-
level construction whose ultimate purpose is trading done by dealing rooms of 
many different financial institutions (Bookstaber 2017). The dealing rooms are 
connected with the units that deliver short-term funding and borrow securities 
enabling collateralized borrowing on the repo market or through rehypotheca-
tion. The backbone of the whole structure is represented by broker-dealer banks, 
which trade with many different kinds of shadow banks such as hedge funds, se-
curitization funds, etc. The problem is that it is difficult to predict how such a sys-
tem will evolve (Tarullo 2017b). One of the risk factors is that a part of corporate 
chronically excess savings flow (through the repo market) to fund shadow banks 
holding highly leveraged portfolios of illiquid bonds, which caused a cumulation 
of risk within the financial system (Pozsar 2014). 
3.2. Free banking, digital currencies, and narrow money 
Nowadays we witness the emergence of privately issued digital monies. This re-
calls the period of free banking, when commercial banks were issuing hundreds 
of different banknotes. These banknotes played the role of money because they 
were convertible into gold (species) at a fixed rate. If digital monies were to be 
actual money, they would have to be convertible into some kind of legal tender 
(cash, central bank reserves) at a fixed rate. Without this, they will continue to 
remain assets, as is the case today, which constitutes an additional financial sta-
bility risk factor. 
It is worth recalling why there had been no overissuance of money during the 
free banking era. The reason was that at that time, banks were extending mainly 
short-term self-liquidating working capital loans. In such a situation, credit and 
money creation tended to adjust to the demand for money. The problem with 
digital monies is that they do not enter the economy through the creation of short-
term self-liquidating loans. There is no mechanism potentially adjusting their 
supply to the demand for money. 
In 1948, Friedman proposed such a mechanism, assuming that the volume of 
tax revenues and expenditures might be set in such a way that the budget would 
be in balance when the economy grew at a rate consistent with its potential. Con-
sequently, a budget deficit would signal that the economy is growing below its 
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potential. Under such assumptions, money financing of the budget deficit would 
mean nothing more than adjusting the money supply to demand, consistent with 
the equilibrium growth path. Similarly, a budget surplus would signify that the 
GDP growth is above the economy’s potential. Thus, through investing budg-
et surpluses in capital markets, the government would destroy a part of money 
supply, adjusting it to a money demand consistent with potential GDP growth 
(Friedman 1948). 
Milton Friedman’s proposal is exceptional in its clarity, even if it would not 
be politically viable to construct a budget fulfilling conditions he formulated. In 
general, however, the alternative banking reform schemes do not offer specific 
macroeconomic recipes as to how the state could create and control money sup-
ply. A likely reason for this omission is the difficulty to devise a system that 
would be fully resistant to the government misuse of its power to issue money. 
Even if central banks decided to issue their own digital money, e.g., to elimi-
nate cash and circumvent the zero lower bound in their interest rate policy, they 
would encounter the same problem that emerged when narrow money concept 
(government issued money) was put forward (Simons 1936). The proposal envis-
aged that households and corporations would hold their money balances with nar-
row banks, which would keep their assets in the form of the central bank’s liquid 
reserves and short-term government paper.
The intention of the narrow banking proposal was to solve the bank runs prob-
lem plaguing the US banking system in the 19th century. Despite the fact that the 
deposit insurance system eliminated this problem (in the case of retail deposits), 
the proposal of narrow banking reappeared (Benes – Kumhof 2012), which was 
a reaction to the stalemate in credit and money creation after the recent banking 
crisis. 
Nonetheless, the implementation of the narrow banking concept would pose 
risks to financial stability. The problem is that if narrow banks were holding 
their assets in the form of liquid reserves held with central bank and in the 
form of short-term Treasury bills, some other financial institutions (e.g. savings 
banks) could have to extend loans. Due to the risk premium, they would earn 
more than the narrow banks and would offer higher interest on deposits. Under 
these circumstances, households and firms would move their deposits from nar-
row banks to lending institutions in times of economic expansion, while there 
would be outflows of deposits from lending institutions to narrow banks during 
economic downturns. This might make the banking system highly procyclical 
(Goodhart 1994). 
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3.3. The problem of mortgage lending
Whatever the weaknesses of the narrow money proposal, the problem which 
caused its reappearance was the change of the banking business model which 
made banks exposed to severe mortgage crises having the potential to put credit 
and money creation to a halt (during balance sheet recessions) as was the case in 
Japan after the 1990 crisis and in several countries after the 2007 crisis. 
The change in the banking model took place in the 1970s and the 1980s. Previ-
ously, banks were relatively safe institutions extending mainly working capital 
loans to the corporate sector. This changed when universal banks started to build 
large trading portfolios and then entered mortgage lending en masse. 
Both changes generated a greatly increased demand for wholesale short-term 
funding which was created on the interbank money market. Due to the banks’ 
adoption of the new business model, the average bank rates of return became 
much higher, although at the cost of their much higher volatility. The massive use 
of wholesale short-term funding made banks much more interconnected, which 
exposed them to the increased systemic risk (Shin 2012; Jorda et. al. 2015).
One of the solutions proposed after the 2008 global banking crises was ring-
fencing, i.e., limiting commercial banks’ activities to their core business. The 
problem is that mortgage is does also assumed to be commercial banks’ core ac-
tivity despite its high procyclicality (Leamer 2007). Moreover, contrary to com-
mon belief, mortgage lending does not (and should not) create money. Money 
supply consisting of households and firms’ bank account balances that are held to 
fund their current spending on goods and services. The buyer of a house typically 
does not use a mortgage loan to cover his or her current spending.2 Similarly, the 
seller of a house usually does not use the revenues to cover his or her ongoing 
expenditures on goods and services. 
To neutralize the risk that mortgage crashes followed by severe banking crises 
might again put credit and money creation to a halt, strong institutional precau-
tions should be adopted to limit mortgage loan funding to the loanable savings. 
This would need to give central banks convincing mandate to use monetary and 
macroprudential policies for containing housing booms. 
2  The exceptions were mortgage equity withdrawals (MEW) enabled refinancing of mortgage 
loans when property prices were risking before the recent global financial crisis (Greenspan – 
Kennedy 2008).
CENTRAL BANKS: HESITANT GUARDIANS OF EQUILIBRIUM  135
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
During the gold standard system, central banks were focused on keeping external 
equilibrium, which was perceived to be sufficient due to the strong self-regula-
tory capacities of market economies. The experiences of the Great Depression 
refocused central banks on their role in keeping internal equilibrium in their do-
mestic economies. 
After World War 2, central banks were expected to stabilize overall demand. 
Since the late 1950s, the Phillips curve seemed to offer the possibility to choose 
the best possible combination of rate of unemployment and inflation. The experi-
ences of the 1970s illustrated that using monetary expansion to boost economic 
growth may steepen the Phillips curve and produce stagflation. The steep shape 
of the Phillips curve triggered the decision to give central banks independence 
and concentrate their role on stabilizing inflation. 
The New Keynesian models, providing the intellectual foundation for modern 
monetary policy, assumed that central banks may concentrate on stabilizing in-
flation as credit and money creation is neutral for the economy in the long run. 
Hyman Minsky’s (1982) financial instability hypothesis was ignored until the 
outbreak of the recent global banking crisis (McCulley 2009). 
The experiences of the recent global banking crisis and the Great Recession 
it caused (along with Japan’s lost decades) revealed that monetary policy might 
not be effective enough in overcoming a protracted weakness of the domestic 
demand, which in the case of secular stagnation may call for a reinterpretation of 
the way monetary and fiscal policies are coordinated. 
The two important factors leading to the 2007–2008 global banking crisis 
were the unsustainable mortgage booms and the massive issuance of illiquid (i.e., 
risky) asset-backed securities (ABS). Both were financed with short-term whole-
sale funding. After the crisis, Basel III limited the possibilities of using short-term 
funds for mortgage loan funding. Nonetheless, the shadow money, e.g., deposits 
created on the repo market, still finance shadow banks’ assets stuffed with illiquid 
bonds. Central banks, as independent institutions, are best suited to conduct ef-
fective macroprudential policy aimed at curbing financial cycles. However, the 
arsenal of their macroprudential policy does not seem sufficient to meet the task 
(Borio 2015). 
We would like to conclude by underlining that being hesitant is actually a ma-
jor advantage of monetary policy decision-makers. The ability to verify the ad-
equacy of the prevailing best practice to the constantly evolving economy proves 
to be critical to steering through the rough waters of the uncertain future. Du-
bito ergo cogito is more than relevant for monetary policy (Yellen 2017; Tarullo 
2017a; Wyplosz 2017).
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5. GENERAL DISCUSSION
In our paper we show that central banks cannot rely fully on what is considered 
the best practice in conducting monetary policy and they have to cope with finan-
cial system inherent instability resulting from the fact that financial institutions 
(especially banks) enjoy soft budget constraint being able to create themselves 
their sources of funding, e.g. the wholesale deposit market. Both notions, i.e. the 
non-ergodicity of the economic systems and the soft budget constraint, are deeply 
rooted in János Kornai intellectual heritage. 
János Kornai’s Anti-Equilibrium. On Economic Theory and Tasks of Research, 
originally published in 1971 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company) 
was a pioneering work not only because it delivered insightful criticism of the 
theory of general equilibrium. It played an important role in this respect since 
the subsequent elaborations and developments of the theory – influenced by his 
criticism – were based on increasingly more realistic assumptions. Its pioneering 
importance is that Kornai questioned the view that economic systems tend to 
operate in an equilibrium. 
János Kornai’s work blazed the trail followed today by many economists. But 
his publications apply to many fields of social sciences. The perhaps most inspir-
ing example is his book Non-Equilibrium Social Science and Policy. Introduction 
and Essays on New and Changing Paradigms in Socio-Economic Thinking (eds 
Johnson et al. 2017).
Adopting the cognitive perspective proposed by Kornai, we reject the belief 
that economic systems tend to return to a sustainable equilibrium. Instead, they 
are often characterized by disequilibrium. Hence, the fundamental research ques-
tion is whether or not such disequilibrium leads to the collapse or gradual de-
composition of the entire system. It is therefore important to consider what is 
essential for keeping economic systems in a state of a stable disequilibrium and 
how to prevent the occurrence of unstable disequilibria leading to serious crises 
or long-term stagnation 
The instability of social systems (not only of economic ones) can be perceived 
as a tension between their functionality and dysfunctionality. We believe that all 
social systems may gradually become dysfunctional in the course of their de-
velopment. They undergo similar processes as the human body, which ages and 
transforms. It means that in time, all social systems start to exhibit different de-
grees of disability, which are signs of their routinization and rigidity as well as 
of the formation of an array of interests within them, which petrifies them, limits 
their flexibility, and adversely affects system adaptability. It always happens in a 
specific historical context in consequence of the actions of certain social actors 
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and the relations between them. But in principle, whatever happens, the whole 
system evolves in a similar way. 
It should be noted that just as in the case with human bodies, certain “self-correc-
tive” mechanisms are built into social systems. They operate automatically. They do 
not restore equilibrium, but prevent increasing imbalance from threatening the sta-
bility of a given system. And systems that have such built-in compensation mecha-
nisms have a higher adaptive capacity and are thus more efficient in the long run.
However, if a given system is seriously dysfunctional, these automatic mecha-
nisms may not be sufficient and the system loses its stability.
Since social systems are gradually becoming dysfunctional, they need to have 
their functionality restored through reforms from time to time. If they are not 
reformed, the process of their dysfunctionalization gradually leads to their col-
lapse. The complexity of the problem is that the system’s internal forces are often 
insufficient for implementing a system-wide reform. In these cases, reform can 
only be achieved by incorporating external energy, which derives from a broader 
institutional order.
No economic system is perfect or devoid of weaknesses. No system is free of 
serious problems or capable of solving all of them. At the same time, not one of 
them is immutable – each constantly transforms itself and evolves. In no eco-
nomic system is it possible to achieve a sustainable equilibrium. Constant change 
is a feature of modern societies; consequently, no equilibrium can be permanent. 
Each state of balance is temporary and fragile.
Certainly, it is possible to try and preserve a system’s balance by means of 
far-reaching state interference in the market and in the economy as a whole. 
However, this invariably leads to the centralization of economic power and the 
nationalization of the economy. A balance thus achieved hinders innovation and 
development, and, in consequence, undermines democracy. Such a route has al-
ways led to the backwoods of history.
We can also assume that we are doomed to disequilibrium; however, we can 
opt for its aspects that together contribute to development and reasonably limit 
the consequences of those traits that are socially painful. This is an area where 
institutional solutions, clearly favored by János Kornai, are to be sought. 
Currently, we can observe a spectacular example of the necessity of institu-
tional change. The recent global financial crisis and the Great Recession it caused 
could not be alleviated without large-scale state intervention. Without it (e.g., 
large-scale QE programs), the recession would have been much deeper and more 
protracted. Without significant institutional reform (e.g., establishing macropru-
dential authorities in a number of countries and implementing a number of new 
tools for stabilizing financial system), we might have been witnessing a much 
longer period of economic and financial disarray. 
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